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Following the European Union’s historic decision to grant Ukraine candidate status and NATO’s summit in Madrid, Kyiv officially embarked on the EU membership path with strong military support from key allies. This has prompted speculation about its accession date to the EU.

Different terms have been voiced, with “decades” suggested by French President Emmanuel Macron; five to ten years by others; and a more ambitious but perhaps unrealistic period of one to three years put forward by the Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Ihor Zhovkva.

President Volodymyr Zelensky could be right when he says that Ukraine’s ability to obtain candidate status in just several months could also lead to completing the EU accession journey in less than a decade. Indeed, before the war, Ukraine’s prospects of acceding to the EU, and NATO too for that matter, seemed profoundly unattainable.

Russia’s invasion has caused seismic changes within Ukrainian society, leading to a burst of enthusiasm to integrate with the EU and NATO. But Kyiv’s preparedness to translate words into actionable reform is still questionable.

Brussels knows that all too well, which is one of the reasons why it had been reluctant to grant Ukraine EU candidate status until the last minute. Meanwhile, NATO still shows no sign of willing to fulfill its decade-old promise to take Kyiv in.

Sluggish progress

Take the Association Agreement, a key document defining and regulating EU-Ukraine relations since 2014. Its implementation, albeit with success in some areas, has oftentimes been sluggish and close-to-none in areas like judicial reform.

This has forced the EU to cite reforms among its seven key demands, upon which Ukraine’s EU candidate status is contingent. These include, but at not limited to, reform of the Constitutional Court and the implementation of the anti-oligarchic law, which are also of particular interest to NATO.

Regrettably, changes are yet to take place in all of these domains, with the Presidential Administration still putting off the appointment of the Head of the Specialized Anti-corruption Prosecution, one of the key EU demands that Zelensky promised the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and even U.S. President Joe Biden to deal with personally.

It is easy to blame this hesitance on vested interests and oligarchic influence. Yet to a great degree it also stems from the Ukrainian mindset and habits.

Understanding who stands to benefit from reform

Kyiv’s perception of EU and NATO requirements is that Ukraine is somehow being forced to jump through hoops for the benefit of its neighbors. While there has admittedly been more stick than carrot where Ukraine’s membership is concerned, it is hardly the eurocrats or NATO officials who stand to profit most in this situation.

Ukraine needs to carry out a host of reforms for the well-being of its citizens and its economy – not to appease a high-profile or tick a box.

The Ukraine-EU border reform is a good example of what this means.

From the EU/NATO perspective, this transformation is necessary to increase border transparency and security, combat smuggling and corruption, and boost trade. For Ukrainians, these changes are necessary for other practical reasons: a clean and organized border, shorter queues for tourists and labor migrants, and the feeling that your country is as attractive as the neighboring one.

Unfortunately, the current state of Ukrainian border infrastructure is a long way off providing this experience, with Ukraine failing to deliver on most of its decade-long promises to reconstruct checkpoints and organize a solid border-crossing procedure.

In pre-war times, the idea that reforms are a necessity for one’s own sake rather than simply an external burden seldom prevailed among politicians and citizens alike – and it is still unclear whether that has changed.

On the one hand, there are some glimmers of hope. One is the speedy ratification of the Istanbul Convention after more than a decade of hesitation. Another concerns statements by high officials like Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine Olha Stefanishyna, and Head of the President’s Office of Ukraine Andriy Yermak, who understand that Ukraine is the only one in charge of expediting its EU membership bid and completing judicial and State Security Service reforms, which NATO is especially keen on.

On the other hand, the Specialized Anti-corruption Prosecution head appointment saga has no end in sight – and it is just one of the myriads of steps that Ukraine must complete in its EU and NATO accession path. Others will be equally challenging.

This is where an overhaul in mindset plays a critical role.

It is encouraging to see that the war has made Ukrainians realize which values they hold dear, boosting support for EU and NATO memberships to 90% and 73% respectively — around 30% more than in pre-war times.

But it would also be hypocritical to claim that the Ukrainian government’s murky ways of conducting business and obstructing essential reforms exist in a vacuum. In many respects, the Ukrainian government reflects how ordinary people run their errands and think – while accusing the government of doing the same.

To change this approach, Ukrainians must realize that if they want to become EU and/or NATO members, they are the ones who stand to benefit the most from the requisite reforms, even if that means giving up on established ways of finding workarounds and making a living space out of chaos.

The sooner this realization sinks in, with the government feeling societal pressure mounting, the faster Ukraine will complete the necessary reforms and become a full-fledged EU member; possibly even a NATO member too as it is possible that it could circumvent the need to complete a Membership Action Plan.

Otherwise, it might end up in “the waiting club” that the PM of Albania Edi Rama welcomed Ukraine to on the day of the historic EU summit, and remain a perennial NATO aspirant.

Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian political scientist and analyst. A graduate of Lund University (MSc in European Affairs), she covers issues relating to international affairs, migration, and disinformation.

This article was originally published on Kyiv Post.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.