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Far right parties’ vote share did not increase on the scale some expected. But in the long-term, their ideas may affect EU policy on migration, environment, security and enlargement.

Between 6 and 9 June 2024, across the European Union, just under 400 million people voted in European Parliamentary elections to elect 720 MEPs. These elections matter, deciding who represents EU citizens in the European Parliament – and kickstarting negotiations for the new president of the European Commission, the powerful body that proposes policies and legislation for the EU. 

Far right political parties made gains – but did not do quite as well as some anticipated. While Italy, France and Germany saw significant gains for the far right, the picture across the rest of the EU is more nuanced. Far right parties only came first in five countries, and second or third in another five, predominantly at the expense of liberal and green parties. 

While the far right ‘surge’ failed to materialize, the long-term trend demonstrates increasing support for anti-establishment, populist and Eurosceptic parties at both the European and national levels. 

This is reason for concern, especially as centre parties continue to normalize far right parties by adopting their ideas and rhetoric. 

What is the European Parliament and how has it been changed by the election? 

The European Parliament is the EU’s law-making body and budgetary authority. It works together with the European Council to pass laws based on proposals by the European Commission. It also approves or rejects the budget. 

The Parliament is made up of elected representatives of EU citizens, who sit in political groups based on political affiliation. When voting on legislation these groups often form coalitions on an issue-by-issue basis.

The centre right European People’s Party (EPP), the centre left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group, and the liberal Renew group remain, respectively, the three largest groupings in Parliament. 

However, the elections have significantly eroded the influence of Renew – the party of French President Emmanuel Macron. Formerly a key player, it has suffered significant defeat, considered so damaging domestically that Macron called a snap French parliamentary election the day after results were in. 

Previously the EPP and S&D in particular have cooperated to pass legislation, supported by Renew. But the EPP has recently sought closer alignment with the far right European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, upsetting parties within S&D in particular – so this dynamic may change in the new Parliament.

The ability of far right parties to exert real influence in the Parliament will be impacted by how united they can be. They are not in alignment on key issues such as support for Ukraine.

By contrast, far right groups including the ECR and the Identity and Democracy (ID) group – the latter hosts France’s Marine le Pen and her National Rally party (RN) – have had their parliamentary presence boosted. A host of other new far right parties, who don’t yet have a political home, will likely swell the ranks of these two groups. 

Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) will enter the Parliament for the first time with 15 seats, and Hungary’s Fidesz (10 seats) is looking for a new home after leaving the EPP in 2021 (before it was ejected). These two national parties, together with ECR and ID, hold 156 seats – more than the S&D group. Some have speculated a far right super group could emerge, combining ECR and ID – but this is unlikely given the ideological divisions of parties within each group.

Indeed, membership of groups on the far right in particular, but also to a lesser extent the centre will likely continue to shift and splinter in the coming weeks and months due to continued inter-faction quarrelling, impacting their ability to exert influence. Renew is debating whether to oust the Dutch Conservative Party for its domestic coalition with the far right Freedom Party – even though doing so would reduce Renew’s seat count further. 

The ability of far right parties to exert real influence in the Parliament will be impacted by how united they can be. They are not in alignment on key issues such as support for Ukraine, and fiscal responsibilities. 

Making pan-European agreements on policy issues also runs counter to the nationalistic instincts of many far right parties, particularly those in ID. Their level of engagement in the Parliament has also been low in the past, with far right MEPs regularly failing to show up for votes. 

Effects on how the EU functions: the Council and the Commission

Far right parties did not perform as well as anticipated in June’s elections. But the trend at both EU and national level is one of growing support for populist, nationalist and in some cases, Eurosceptic parties. 

In Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy and Croatia, the far right is part of governing coalitions. In Austria the far right is leading polls ahead of national elections in September. In Portugal and Slovakia, the far right increased their vote share significantly in recent national elections. 

As the number of Eurosceptic leaders and parties increase at national level, the positions that member states take at the Council may change.

This trend affects the composition and working of the European Council and the Council of Ministers, the bodies where member states’ heads of government ministers and national ministers respectively come together and set the high-level policy agenda and adopts EU laws.  

As the number of Eurosceptic leaders and parties increase at national level, the positions that member states take at the Council may change. Member states may well also step up their attempts to weaken the EU’s policy and legislative powers in favour of national processes – hollowing out the EU from within. 

Where the new European Parliament’s composition perhaps matters most in the short term is the vote for the new European Commission President. Incumbent Ursula von der Leyen is seeking a new term. If she is unanimously nominated by the European Council, she will need to pass a vote in the European Parliament. 

In 2019, she only scraped through with a majority of nine votes. Some parties who backed her last time have already said they will not support a second term. Von der Leyen will have to negotiate with parties in S&D and Renew to retain their support, or may need to turn to the ECR. The latter will likely require her to make concessions, dragging her agenda further right.  

Migration policy: far right has already made its mark 

The influence of the far right on migration policy was already being felt before the elections. Over the last year the EPP has adopted far right policy positions on tackling illegal immigration. ID has claimed that their demands made it into the final text of an EU Council’s conclusions. Hostility towards immigration into the EU is perhaps the sole policy issue the various far right factions agree on.

Centrist parties have tried to adopt far right narratives on immigration at both national and EU level, hoping to retain voters who might otherwise consider defecting to far right parties.

Far right parties have used immigration to exploit people’s genuine grievances about healthcare, housing and the cost of living. This has made the debate around immigration particularly sensitive in member states, especially after high numbers of migrants arrived in 2015–16. Since then, centrist parties have tried to adopt far right narratives on immigration at both national and EU level, hoping to retain voters who might otherwise consider defecting to far right parties.

The effect has been a series of EU policies centred on two axes. First has been the outsourcing of immigration management, yielding a series of agreements with countries in the EU’s neighbourhood aimed at preventing immigrants from reaching the EU – regardless of the poor human rights records of some of these countries, such as Libya and Tunisia.

Second is the securitization of migration to the EU – the framing of migration as a security threat. This prompted a number of policies on border controls and deterrence of migrants, including the New Pact on Migration and Asylum adopted by the EU Council in May, the biggest overhaul of EU migration policy in over a decade.

As the new migration pact moves towards implementation, the far right will likely claim that the pact does not go far enough. The ECR’s manifesto called for an enhancement of EU border controls and is in favour of asylum claims being processed outside of the EU.

Climate policy: progress may be at risk

During the election campaign, far-right parties announced that they would contest the implementation of Europe’s Green Deal – a set of policies to make EU climate, energy, transport and taxation policies fit for ensuring the bloc’s transition to net zero carbon emissions by 2050. Both Poland’s opposition Law and Justice party (PiS) and Flemish nationalist Flemish Interest (VB) party opposed the Green Deal during their European election campaigns.

The ECR…strongly opposes the more ambitious carbon reduction target of 90 per cent by 2040 that the European Commission proposed in February 2024. 

Although most of the Green Deal directives and related acts and policies were finalized in recent months, their implementation could be undermined by far right opposition. Some sense that mainstream parties are already backpedalling on climate policy to accommodate far right views. For instance, the centre-right EPP’s manifesto announced that they would oppose the planned phase-out of the combustion engine by 2035 – partly, it is thought, because many far right parties strongly oppose this policy. 

Another measure heavily opposed by far right parties was the Nature Restoration Law, adopted by the parliament in February 2024. 

The law aims to rehabilitate at least 20 per cent of EU land and sea areas by 2030 and all degraded ecosystems by 2050, which far right groups argue would affect farmers. It may now be watered down to avoid widespread pan-European protests of the kind seen last year.

The ECR also strongly opposes the more ambitious carbon reduction target of 90 per cent by 2040 that the European Commission proposed in February 2024. 

During COP28 in December 2023, the EU pushed for a global transition away from fossil fuels and should lead the way by transparently showing how it will phase out of fossil fuels as part of its 2040 target.

However, it will be more difficult for the EU to take on a global leadership role with expanded far right influence in Parliament. Suspicion of net zero ambitions is another policy area that unites many elements of the far right, although with some disagreement on policy.

A more right wing parliament could seek to push through new mining rules that reduce environmental safeguards for mining projects, undermining support on a sensitive issue

The EU’s ability to contribute financially (in a meaningful way) to the Loss and Damage fund and to supporting adaptation in countries of the Global South may also be affected.      

The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, adopted by the European Parliament in December 2023 with widespread support, could also suffer as a result of far right gains. The new Commission will be tasked with implementing this act, particularly how to meet targets on domestic extraction, processing and recycling of metals and minerals needed for the energy transition and digitalization.

A more right wing Parliament could seek to push through new mining rules that reduce environmental safeguards for mining projects, undermining support on a sensitive issue that requires trust-building and close cooperation between industry, local communities, EU regulators and environmental groups.

Foreign policy and defence: vulnerable to the ‘Orbán’ effect 

If re-elected as Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen will focus the Commission’s efforts on security and defence, and enlargement. The Parliament has limited influence on foreign policy, as foreign policy resolutions in the Parliament are non-binding. However, they are a barometer of where parties stand on issues.  

The bigger challenge in the short and medium-term is how to deal with obstructive member states in the European Council, such as Hungary.

Support for Ukraine in the war against Russia is the dominant but perhaps least controversial foreign policy issue. Votes in the parliament consistently pass with high support: the last vote in February 2024 passed with 451 votes in favour, 46 against, and 49 abstentions. 

Even more controversial trade liberalization measures between Ukraine and the EU have a large majority of support in the Parliament. That support is unlikely to change, despite the increase in numbers of MEPs who back Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. 

The bigger challenge in the short and medium-term is how to deal with obstructive member states in the European Council, such as Hungary. Its populist leader Viktor Orbán has been sceptical of sanctions on Russia and of support for Ukraine. Populists in other countries – Robert Fico in Slovakia, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands – may emulate Orbán’s positions in the EU Council. 

In countries where populist parties may not be at the helm, but are gaining ground in support among voters, heads of government may become less ambitious in their support for Ukraine, particularly on trade liberalization. 

Parliament’s impact on defence is indirect. National security remains a national competency, and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy is intergovernmental. Where the Parliament does have an influence, however, is in approving the EU’s budget. Here, it may closely scrutinize defence spending, creating delay.  

EU enlargement is once again a top foreign policy priority, in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In many European capitals, the accession of the Western Balkan and Eastern European countries is considered essential to ensure the security of the EU and its neighbours.

Enlargement may not be a main campaign issue, but the surge in votes for these parties does point to ambivalence at best – opposition at worst – to EU enlargement. 

Yet voters across Europe are increasingly supporting parties that do not necessarily back this agenda. 

According to polls, public support for Ukraine joining the EU is lowest in Hungary, Slovakia, France and Austria – all countries where far-right parties have a strong influence. Parties such as the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), the RN in France, Austria’s Freedom Party (FPO) and Germany’s AfD are broadly sceptical of further EU enlargement. 

All have made significant gains in the elections, and have or likely will gain significant support in their national parliamentary elections too. Enlargement may not be a main campaign issue, but the surge in votes for these parties does point to ambivalence at best – opposition at worst – to EU enlargement. 

There are some exceptions: Poland’s PiS considers Ukraine’s accession important for its national security; and in Hungary, the ruling Fidesz party has been pushing for the accession of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – both currently led by leaders friendly to Russia.

Accession to the EU is a multi-year process, and it is unlikely that any of the candidate countries will be ready to join the EU in the next five years. For enlargement-related issues that do require a vote in the European Parliament, it is unlikely that far-right MEPs would be able to rally a majority to swing a vote – especially given the divisions among far right groupings on this issue. 

Broadly two-thirds of ECR MEPs have voted for enlargement-related resolutions, whereas ID MEPs have not or have abstained. But it might make debates about issues like financial assistance for enlargement-related reforms more difficult.

Pro-enlargement politicians and governments will need to make a clear case for enlargement to their populations and have a public debate about its impact, for instance the possible redistribution of EU cohesion and agricultural funds. Not doing so risks the debate being hijacked by populist politicians, as happened with migration, further fuelling support for the far-right. 

The economy

It is much less clear what implications increased support for the far right will have for the EU’s core economic policies. Three policy areas will be critical. 

The first is pan-EU fiscal policy. All parties on the far-right are in favour of greater national sovereignty over economic policy decisions. But this manifests in diverging priorities: some parties – notably the AfD – favour imposing strong fiscal discipline over other member states and oppose raising common debt to achieve pan-EU objectives. For others, such as the Brothers of Italy, it means keeping fiscal constraints on member states as loose as possible and taking full advantage of funds raised by issuing common debt.

These differences could come to a head with the implementation of three pieces of legislation adopted by the European Council in April. These fundamentally reform the EU’s rules governing how member states must manage fiscal policy. 

The stated goal is to reduce debt ratios and deficits in a sustained manner, while protecting investments in strategic areas such as digital, green or defence industries. The new framework, which was finalized after much wrangling and revision, marks an end to the looser budget controls of the pandemic era. 

The current economic outlook for the Union is relatively positive, with the European Commission’s May forecast indicating annual GDP growth in the EU economy will rise to 1 per cent in 2024 and 1.6 per cent in 2025. Inflation is predicted to fall sharply to 2.2 per cent in 2025. 

But if this outlook should worsen, for example due to a newly elected President Trump imposing significant import tariffs, the strains on the Union’s weaker economies with high public debt could be intense. This would put the new fiscal framework to a severe test. 

The second key area of economic policy to watch is financial stability. Historically, crises are one of the most important drivers of economic policy and institutional reform in the EU. In the 2007-8  global financial crisis, the subsequent eurozone crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic, EU-level action was considered essential to supporting each member state’s response. 

Should the Union face renewed threats to its financial stability…some far right parties may resist further EU-level institutional development on grounds of national sovereignty. 

But the Banking Union, a key safeguard against future financial stability crises, remains incomplete. The single deposit insurance scheme that it envisages is still not operational, posing a continuing long-term risk to the viability of the monetary union.

Should the Union face renewed threats to its financial stability, this will move quickly up the policy agenda and some far right parties may resist further EU-level institutional development on grounds of national sovereignty. Others could take a pragmatic approach given their appreciation of the extraordinary economic costs if the monetary union dissolves.  

The third area of economic policy on which far right groups may have a significant influence is economic security. The European Commission proposed a number of tools to strengthen the EU’s economic security in January, including improvements to understanding of potential risks associated with EU investments abroad, and better screening of foreign investments into the EU.  

Both the EPP and S&D have advocated ‘Made in Europe 2030’ strategies which include providing support to European manufacturers. 

Further policy areas that are likely to be affected by economic security considerations include safeguarding energy supplies, access to raw materials, and protection of technology and trade policy. 

Economic security could also help drive a revival of interest in creating a Capital Markets Union (CMU), given the possibility that increasing geopolitical tensions could reduce the free flow of capital globally.

The key policy decision facing the Union will be how far to go down a unilateral route in pursuit of greater economic security and how far to prioritize rules-based multilateral solutions. A stronger voice for far right parties may push it more in the first direction.

Armida van Rij, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme.

Professor Tim Benton, Research Director; Director, Environment and Society Centre.

Creon Butler, Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme.

Dr Patrick Schröder, Senior Research Fellow, Environment and Society Centre.

This article was originally published on Chatham House.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.