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IT is often argued that Pakistan lacks a clear and independent Afghan policy. What the establishment has historically pursued on the Afghan front has largely been an extension of its India-centric approach. Once a pro-India regime was dislodged in Kabul, Islamabad appeared uncertain about navigating the new reality. Much of the establishment and its aligned intelligentsia held utopian expectations of forging transnational mega projects and cultivating a friendly regime in the neighbourhood.

Those belonging to the millennial and Gen X cohorts may recall the slogans and chants from po¬¬litical rallies of the IslamiJamhooriIttehad, a po¬¬l¬¬i¬¬tical alliance engineered by Gen Hamid Gul to counter Benazir Bhutto’s PPP and to preserve the so-called gains the establishment had made throu¬¬gh its involvement in the Afghan jihad. One slogan stood out in particular: “Tum nay Dhaka diya, hum nay Kabul liya” (‘You lost Dhaka, and we gained Kabul’). This was a jibe at the PPP, which the establishment blamed for the loss of East Pakistan.

While the PML, led primarily by Nawaz Sharif, was the establishment’s favoured political force, the Jamaat-i-Islami dominated the ideological narrative within the alliance. The JI was one of the key allies of the establishment in waging jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It also has a controversial history of violently opposing Bengali demands for political rights, including through the formation of militias to suppress the pro-independence movement in East Pakistan. As an ideological partner of the establishment, the JI played a significant role in sowing the seeds of extremism and violence within Pakistani society.

Despite enjoying institutional backing, the JI has consistently failed to win popular support or achieve meaningful electoral victories — outcomes the establishment long hoped for but never realised.

The Taliban are stoking anti-Pakistan sentiment within Afghanistan.

In essence, the JI played a pivotal role in helping the establishment craft its Afghan policy, aligning it with Pakistan’s broader strategic approach towards India. Since Pakistan’s inception, Afghanistan has only reluctantly accepted its sovereignty, frequently supporting ethnic and separatist movements in KP and Balochistan and maintaining close ties with India. However, while Afghanistan has remained a constant source of tension, it has never posed a direct military threat to Pakistan, even during the wars of 1965 and 1971.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have always had the possibility of developing cordial relations despite aligning with opposing blocs during the Cold War era. However, the ego-driven power elites on both sides rarely missed an opportunity to provoke or antagonise one another.

Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban was based on the assumption that it would secure a friendly regime on its western border. Critics, however, question the establishment’s definition of a ‘friendly nation’, arguing that it often implies a desire to dominate or make others subservient. But it’s quite straightforward: a country’s national character or ‘DNA’ does not change with a change in regime. Even when new governments are grateful to their external backers, realpolitik and national interests eventually shape relationships.

The TTP has become one of the most serious irritants in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, exposing the deep fault lines between the two nations. When faced with a choice, the Afghan Taliban regime appeared to favour the TTP over maintaining smooth relations with Pakistan. In doing so, it followed the familiar pattern of previous Afghan governments approaching their ties with Islamabad.

Pakistan’s long-held dream of securing strategic depth through a Taliban-controlled Kabul has now largely unravelled. While it may not have entirely abandoned hope, Pakistan is struggling to come to terms with its miscalculations, particularly the assumption that a Taliban regime would serve its strategic interests unconditionally. There remains anxiety in Islamabad over Afghanistan’s potential for developing closer ties with India, which Pakistan sees as a threat to its western flank.

The friction in bilateral ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects a deep-seated mistrust that continues to grow despite ongoing diplomatic efforts to maintain a basic level of cooperation on trade and border security. Afghan refugees in Pakistan have become collateral damage in this strained relationship. For the Taliban, the issue of the TTP has become a matter of honour, and protecting it as an asset. In defending the group, they have jeopardised their relationship with Pakistan and shown limited concern for the welfare of Afghan nationals residing in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the Taliban are stoking anti-Pakistan sentiment within Afghanistan. Their media outlets are actively highlighting the hardships faced by returning Afghan refugees and the alleged humiliation they suffer in Pakistan. This narrative appears to have gained traction even among Afghans who were previously critical of the Taliban regime. Afghan poets and cultural figures are now romanticising the Taliban’s rule, vilifying Pakistan, and urging refugees to return home after decades of displacement.

The current situation offers an opportunity for soul-searching, particularly for the establishment and its allied religious parties that once championed ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan appears to be in a reactionary mode, and its policy of expelling Afghan refugees may be driven more by political motives than by strategic planning.

This punitive approach reflects not only frustration but also a quiet acknowledgment of the failure of Pakistan’s Afghan policy, a policy that spanned five decades and yielded little more than terrorism, extremism, economic fragility, and weakened governance. These consequences continue to cast a long shadow over Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan.

Reopening old wounds will not lead to healing. What’s needed is a fresh start — a new approach to engagement with Afghanistan. That new beginning could start with revisiting Pakistan’s refugee policy and developing a comprehensive, dignified plan for the safe and voluntary return of Afghan refugees.

Such a plan should go beyond humanitarian concerns and aim to foster bilateral and transnational economic cooperation. Most importantly, it must include a firm commitment to non-interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, regardless of the agendas of global or regional powers. Any new adventure in Afghan territory would not only deepen instability there but also further inflame unrest in Pakistan’s own vulnerable regions, Balochistan and KP, which are already bearing the brunt of flawed past policies.

The writer is a security analyst.

This article was originally published on Dawn.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.