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Looking back at events that caused Hasina’s dramatic fall, it’s clear that a series of miscalculations, driven by an arrogance typical of a leader disconnected from reality, are to blame

Even in mid-July, the former Bangladesh prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, had projected an aura of invincibility — that of a ‘supreme leader’— akin to that of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran despite her official role as a democratically-elected leader in a republic. She governed Bangladesh, a South Asian nation of 170 million people, for over 15 years and across four consecutive terms. However, three of these terms were achieved through highly controversial elections, with the main political Opposition boycotting two of them.

By early August, a series of events led to her downfall and, on August 5, Hasina resigned and fled to India, initially transferring power to the military whose chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, reassured the nation in a televised address that this was not a military coup but a transition to an interim government.

Looking back at the events of the past three weeks that caused Hasina’s dramatic fall from power, it’s clear that a series of miscalculations, driven by an arrogance typical of a leader disconnected from reality, are to blame.

The first domino was moved when, in early July, Hasina embarked on a four-day visit to China following a trip to India two weeks earlier — her first major diplomatic engagements with two of Asia’s giants since her re-election in January. India and China were key to her diplomatic strategy, with India as a political ally and China as an economic partner.

Before her visit to China, two senior aides made controversial remarks. The foreign minister, Mohammed Hasan Mahmud, noted that India had “no objection” to the trip while the party secretary-general, ObaidulQuader, described India as a “political friend” and China as merely a “development partner”. These statements drew criticism from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. The criticism suggested that Hasina’s trip was effectively sanctioned by India and that she was under Indian influence. Apparently, Quader’s comments also displeased China. Local media had expected $20 billion in financial agreements from Beijing but Hasina returned with only $100 million in aid and shortened her visit by one day, leading to speculation that China had snubbed her amidst her government’s financial needs.

After returning from China, Hasina held her usual press conference, a routine she maintains after bilateral trips. Known for her frequent media interactions, Hasina is typically met with deference from journalists who seldom challenge her. However, on July 14, Hasina seemed unusually tired and less confident; this was likely due to the demanding trips and the lack of significant financial support. During the press conference, when asked about the ongoing student-led protests for quota reform which had been going on since early July, Hasina made a critical error. She used the pro-liberation versus anti-liberation rhetoric to describe the students, indirectly labelling them as ‘Razakar’, a term meaning ‘traitor’ and associated with supporters of the Pakistani regime during the 1971 liberation war. This characterisation sparked widespread outrage, thereby escalating a peaceful protest to a violent upheaval.

This was because the quota reform issue has long served as a stand-in for broader criticism of corruption and cronyism. The students’ protest was fundamentally about the unfairness of a system that values personal connections and family ties over merit and capability. The real problem with the quotas for freedom fighters and their families isn’t the quotas themselves but the fact that they are widely seen as a mechanism for patronage and cronyism.

After being labelled as ‘Razakar’, the protesting students organised a massive march in response to Hasina’s comments. Instead of addressing their grievances, Hasina opted for a heavy-handed approach to suppress the uprising. She deployed the Bangladesh Chhatra League, the notorious student wing of the Awami League, and ensured they were supported by the police. This crackdown led to at least six deaths on July 15.

The following day, Hasina addressed the nation on television during which she showed no empathy for the deceased protesters and ignored her role in escalating the violence with her derogatory remarks. That hurt the dignity of the students who were back on the streets in numbers. In the following three days, over 200 people were killed — 78% of the victims were students and civilians, according to Prothom Alo.

Despite the high death toll, the Hasina administration shifted focus to the ‘economic damage’ caused by the protesters and accused Opposition parties of manipulating the protests for political gain. Instead of visiting the grieving families, Hasina prioritised the inspection of damaged properties, which only intensified public anger. Social media erupted with criticism of her perceived lack of empathy, leading to growing discontent among the populace.

Then, on Saturday, tens of thousands of people gathered at the Central Shaheed Minar in Dhaka. Initially, the student protesters had been advocating for quota reform and a list of nine demands, including an apology from Hasina and the dismissal of the home minister. However, by then, their focus had shifted to a single demand: Hasina’s resignation.

Despite the growing outrage, Awami League officials seemed to downplay the people’s anger. On Sunday morning, the state minister for information and broadcasting, Mohammad Ali Arafat, dismissed the Shaheed Minar gathering — he said it was not a “mass upsurge” — and claimed that the students were being misled by the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami. Arafat also said that the Awami League would not bow to the “terrorist forces” of the Opposition and vowed to crush the protests. By the end of the day, around 100 more people had died, prompting students to announce their “Road to Dhaka” march. By Monday noon, Hasina had fled and her government had collapsed.

Throughout the whole crisis, the Hasina government increasingly adopted authoritarian measures, including shutting down the internet and jailing thousands, in an attempt to control the situation. Most notably, it detained six young student protest coordinators under the guise of ‘protective custody’ and coerced them into making statements to halt the demonstrations. Predictably, this only fuelled the outrage further. Once freed, these students clarified the situation, intensifying public anger against the government.

The collapse of Hasina’s authoritarian and unpopular regime has undoubtedly sparked widespread euphoria. However, in a country struggling with rampant inflation and a foreign exchange crisis, the new administration — whoever may form it — will need to deliver significantly better results than the outgoing one. Additionally, resolving the political issues of the past decade will be a formidable challenge given the extensive damage inflicted on institutions by years of politicisation under the authoritarian regime.

Faisal Mahmud is a journalist based in Dhaka.

This article was originally published on The Telegraph online.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.