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In Bangladesh, reform has long been a powerful political word, invoked by successive governments to signal renewal without always delivering institutional change. During Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, the rhetoric of “reform” became a recurring theme across governance, judicial, and administrative sectors. While her government introduced measures aimed at institutional modernisation, such as digital governance and anti-corruption drives, critics argued that many initiatives served to consolidate executive control rather than deepen democratic accountability. So, finally, when her reign ended with the mass uprising in July 2024, people were hopeful of seeing tangible reform and reconstruction of the state.

The echo of reform continued when the interim government (IG) was formed on 8 August 2024, led by Nobel Laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus as Chief Adviser, following Sheikh Hasina's ousting on 5 August 2024 amid nationwide protests, and 11 reform commissions were established afterwards. After IG’s formation, the people’s hope to see reform was gradually eroded when the culture of mob violence became normal, and the nation suffered an unfortunate decline in the law and order. Reform became something intangible and disillusioned. Seeing an oppressive ruling pattern, curtailed freedom of speech, and interference in civil liberties from a political and elected regime is a very normal scene in our country. But seeing the Yunus Administration, which claimed to have zero political aspiration, only proved that the game of politics remained same only with different players.And the price of the interim government’s negligence in running this nation is still unfolding, even though two months have passed since we have a newly elected government. Bangladesh’s debt ratio under the interim government (2024–2026) rose sharply, with borrowing increasing by Tk 41,000 crore within just 43 days of its formation. Analysts note that this surge pushed the country into a more precarious debt position, undermining hopes of fiscal reform. The IG not only sank the country’s economy like a stone, but Bangladesh is also facing a major measles outbreak in 2026, with nearly 10,000 suspected cases and over 120 deaths reported nationwide as of early April, as the IG failed to provide vaccination for it during their tenure. While at least 11 high-level reform commissions were set up in political, economic, and social spheres, none focused on education. 

During the Yunus Administration, the government established a National Consensus Commission (NCC) in the face of divided constitutional and political issues regarding the reform agenda. The NCC officially began its work on February 15, 2025. In pursuit of a broad consensus on reforms, 166 key recommendations from five commissions were sent to various political parties and alliances. Over the course of several phases, the Commission held 72 meetings with 33 political parties and alliances. The discussions led to the drafting of the "National Charter of July 2025," incorporating 84 recommendations, representing both unanimous agreement and some dissenting views from the participating political entities. The Charter was ultimately placed before voters through a referendum held alongside the 13th parliamentary election.

Despite showing numerous failures, the IG successfully held an election with relatively limited election-related violence in February 2026 after a year and a half of its formation, and the responsibilities to implement the reform agendas in the Charter fell onto the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the incumbent of the current Government of Bangladesh. The echoes of reform now continue from the streets to the parliament as the opposition party, Jamaat-e-Islami, and alliances urge and pressure the government to implement the whole package of the charter, including Constitutional amendments. BNP, on the other hand, is continuously reiterating that the BNP will fully implement the July Charter, which the party signed first among political groups. In terms of trust in elected public officials, the question comes up which side, if any, the public should trust with the hard-earned reform decree?

If we look at the details of the reform provisions stated in the charter, some reforms in the charter were prerequisites of the 13th parliamentary election, some need time, and some guide future elections. For example, the July Charter 2025 mandated that each political party nominate at least 5% women candidates for the 300 parliamentary seats. In practice, however, only 78 women out of 1,981 candidates (≈3.93%) contested the election, falling short of the Charter’s threshold pre-election.  

A total of 133 ordinances were passed during the Yunus administration, containing reform aspirations which became the heart of the debate in parliament after the incumbent Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Md. Asaduzzaman presented those in the first parliament sitting on 12 March, 2026. While it's praiseworthy that out of 133 ordinances issued during the interim government, 110 have already been placed in Parliament and passed through 91 bills, 97 unchanged, 13 amended, repealing 7 ordinances related to the Judicial Independence which creates a severe distrust of the BNP, especially when they were the main victim of baseless politically motivated cases and biased judgement on them during the Sheikh Hasina Regime. Although 3 ordinances on the Supreme Court Judges’ Appointment and the Supreme Court Secretariat, which aimed to ensure independence of the Judiciary has been repealed, the High Court has formally published its full judgment calling for an independent Supreme Court Secretariat within three months, arguing that this is necessary for real judicial independence. But the government plans to appeal. Until the appeal is decided, the High Court’s order will remain suspended.  Attorney General Md RuhulQuddusKazal announced that the government will appeal the High Court’s directive to establish a Supreme Court Secretariat, meaning the verdict will not take effect until the Appellate Division issues its final ruling. 

The pressure on the incumbent government mounts as it has failed to present the remaining 16 ordinances, which resulted in auto lapse or drop of those ordinances. The abandoned ordinances include the Prevention of Enforced Disappearance, the National Human Rights Commission Amendment, and the Anti-Corruption Commission. These ordinances hold fundamental reform to ensure human rights, which were brutally abused during the Sheikh Hasina Regime. The lapse of these ordinances not only raises the question if the incumbent government truly wants reform, but it also contradicts the current government’s election manifesto and their repeatedly pronounced commitments.

BNP’s Manifesto states that a Judicial Commission will be established to reform the existing justice system.  Control and disciplinary authority over the subordinate courts will be vested in the Supreme Court. A separate secretariat for the judiciary, under the control of the Supreme Court, will be further strengthened. However, the government will appeal against the very same verdict of the High Court. 

The government’s manifesto also promises to ensure human rights protections in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with appointments to the National Human Rights Commission based on defined criteria. In practice, however, the National Human Rights Commission (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill, 2026, has created more confusion than clarity. Passed in Parliament, it repealed the 2025 Human Rights Commission Ordinance and reinstated the 2009 National Human Rights Commission Act, a law long criticized for its limited investigative powers and weak enforcement mechanisms.

Officials justified the rollback by citing ambiguities in the 2025 ordinance, including unclear provisions on investigation, compensation, penalties, and its overlap with the disappearance law. They argued that restoring the 2009 Act was a temporary measure to avoid leaving the country without a functioning Commission.

Bangladesh’s deeper challenge, however, is not confined to the fate of a few ordinances or contested provisions. What is ultimately at stake is the credibility of reform itself. For decades, governments have publicly embraced the language of reform, yet meaningful accountability has remained partial, selective, and difficult to sustain. That is why the present moment should be viewed not simply as a test of one administration, but as part of a longer political pattern in which promises of institutional change often fall short of structural transformation. Bangladesh has heard the language of reform before. The real question now is whether this moment can move beyond rhetoric and help embed accountability more firmly within the institutions of the state. Otherwise, reform risks remaining what it has too often been: an important promise, but an incomplete one.

•    Marzana Mahnaz is a Research Associate at the Centre for Governance Studies (CGS). 

Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.