Myanmar’s Collapsing North

In a season of stunning military victories for Myanmar’s anti-military revolutionary forces, the capture of the Northern Shan State city of Lashio and the headquarters of the North-East Command is arguably the most significant. Troops of the ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and smaller ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) entered the city several days ago and claimed to have captured the command base and most of the city. It was another remarkable gain from the late-June resumption of Operation 1027 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA) of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army.

Despite the official statement by the Kokang army, there was confusion over whether the whole city, with a pre-offensive population of approximately 350,000 people, had been completely overrun, but that has been confirmed in recent days. After a siege of nearly two weeks, in which MNDAA troops deployed weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), rockets and infantry assaults, the revolutionary forces have made dramatic Myanmar military history with the largest urban area, a major airport, and the first military command HQ captured.

On Friday, the MNDAA killed the NE Command deputy commander Brig-Gen Tin Tun Aung with a barrage of 107mm rockets as he redeployed troops to a hill overlooking Lashio. In recent days, the MNDAA and allies have ambushed attempted reinforcement convoys coming from Tangyan, south-east of Lashio. Attempts to resupply the Myanmar army from the main Mandalay to Lashio highway have been thwarted by the 3BA capturing the towns of Naungkhio, Kyaukme, and Hsipaw. The SAC may be compelled to seek assistance from the closest major cantonment area, the Eastern Central Command at Namsang roughly 250kms south of Lashio.

The MNDAA issued a statement (in Burmese and Chinese) that laid out eight major points for behavior of their forces and the population of Lashio: “Follow Chinese policy of mediation and strive for a quick end to the fighting and peace; to implement ethnic equality and religious freedom;” plus rules on not entering private property, not using civilian homes for military purposes, and not using civilian vehicles or taxing civilians; strict ban on selling or using drugs, and to “to treat well prisoners of war and those who have surrendered their weapons, not allow torture and discrimination for any reason.” 

Already there is ample social media footage of MNDAA troops stopping looters in the city and forcing them to return stolen items. The Kokang have a heavy-handed approach to justice: the group has staged public trials and executions of its own troops and civilians charged with serious crimes in April this year and in 2023.

The military regime, the State Administration Council (SAC), has suffered a string of major military defeats over the past month. One of the other members of the 3BA, the Ta-ang National Liberation (TNLA), has also captured the major gem mining town of Mogok, and in recent days nearby Mong Mit in Shan State. These gains effectively render all of Northern Shan State under the occupation of the anti-SAC resistance. Southwest of Mogok, the 3BA allies the Mandalay People’s Defense Force have attacked military bases in Madaya Township fewer than 60 km from the major city of Mandalay. The fall of Lashio is a major development, but must be cast in the broader context of a collapsing military in multiple locations around Myanmar.

Perhaps the most perplexing twist in the drama is the deployment in Lashio of troops of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), long considered to be Myanmar’s largest and best-equipped ethnic armies. The Wa forces claimed to be operating as ‘peacekeepers’ and entered the city to secure their longstanding liaison office and commercial assets, and reputedly with SAC and MNDAA approval. The UWSA has maintained an ostensible neutrality in the post-coup conflict, although they have assisted multiple armed groups with weapons and other forms of support, including hosting several EAO leaders of the 3BA in their Pangshang headquarters on the Myanmar-China border.

On July 26, the SAC spokesperson Maj-Gen Zaw Min Tun presented a rambling and acerbic version of recent events, discounting claims that the NE Command had fallen. He also savaged the MNDAA and their allies as “those who have a destructive spirit towards this country and the public, the nefarious conspiracy of unfaithful scumbags and organizations, are supporting warlordism.” Sinophobic rhetoric has also spread on pro-SAC Telegram channels.

The fighting has had a devastating impact on the civilian population. Tens of thousands of residents fled the city as the siege intensified, with traffic jams on roads headed to Mandalay and to the Shan state capital of Taunngyi. This adds to the large number of internally displaced persons in the north, and will exacerbate an already dire economic situation of scarce consumer goods and hyper-inflation of rice and fuel. The SAC is also using punitive airstrikes, artillery, and UAV ‘drop bomb’ strikes on civilian targets captured by the Brotherhood. There has already been considerable damage to many towns and infrastructure, and it’s not yet clear if Lashio will be spared or pulverized. The presence of Wa troops may well be a signal to the SAC to refrain from retaliatory strikes.

There is speculation that the 3BA will be reined in by China, who brokered a 'peace deal' called the Haigeng Agreement back in January and have reportedly summoned the group’s leaders and SAC representatives to meet in Kunming in the coming days. The MNDAA claimed to have paused fighting at one point in July as the Chinese Communist Party Third Plenary session was held in Beijing, but there was little evidence of this. Perspectives of Operation 1027 may have to revisit assumptions of Chinese influence and intent and the questionable assertion that Chinese policy is pro-SAC. If Beijing was displeased with the renewed fighting they appear to have little assertive power over the regime or the resistance. The realpolitik for China is that it will be compelled to deal with multiple revolutionary forces in this strategic trade corridor from the border to Mandalay, as the SAC collapses in the north.

David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian, and human rights issues in Myanmar

This article was originally published on Asia Sentinel.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.