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On Aug. 22, Lieutenant General Gun Maw, deputy chair of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), posted a symbolic message through his Facebook account. He shared a movie clip from “Mufasa: The Lion King,” titling his post “Mufasa &Milele” in reference to the heroic lion leader Mufasa and the mythical safe haven, Milele.

The one-and-a-half-minute clip shows Mufasa telling the animals:

“I know you’re afraid, but trust me. Nothing will change if we remain isolated to our own tribes without concern for the fate of others… Today, they are here for us, lions, but I assure you, as you let them walk among you in search of us now, they are plotting to come for you tomorrow.” 

In the story, Mufasa’s unifying appeal brings all animals together to fight against the invading white lions, eventually securing Milele. By posting this, Gun Maw clearly sought to inspire Myanmar’s resistance movement to overcome fragmentation and unite against a common threat. His message quickly went viral, reaching over a million interactions, with many netizens framing the KIO as the natural leader of a united resistance.

Gun Maw’s statement came at a time when Myanmar’s conflict had been tilting back in the junta’s favor. Between October 2023 and April 2025, resistance forces—including ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs)—seized more than 90 towns from the military regime. Since mid-2025, however, the junta has regrouped, retaking key locations such as Moebye and Demoso in Karenni State, Nawnghkio in northern Shan State, and Thabeikkyin in Mandalay Region, while pushing toward Kyaukme and Mogoke.

More significantly, the KIO’s armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), has struggled to combat the junta’s counteroffensive in the jade-rich Hpakant region—the organization’s main source of income—and has failed to capture Bhamo, Kachin State’s second-largest town, despite sustained attempts since December 2024. The regime’s growing reliance on conscription and advanced drone warfare has gradually reversed resistance gains.

At the same time, Beijing has exerted mounting pressure on border-based EAOs to accept ceasefires and prepare for military-organized elections, narrowing the resistance’s strategic options. In an Aug. 20 meeting, for example, the United Wa State Party/Army (UWSP/UWSA) informed three EAOs—the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA); the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA); and the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N)—that, due to unprecedented Chinese pressure, it would cease providing military and financial assistance.

Amid such converging pressures, the resistance stands at a critical juncture, searching for leadership capable of unifying Myanmar’s fragmented armed movements in the face of both the junta’s resurgence and Chinese influence. The pressing question is: Can the KIO become the “Mufasa of Myanmar” by rallying disparate resistance groups into a cohesive force?

The following section considers the roles the KIO has played in the resistance movement, both historically and in recent developments.

Old alliances

The KIO has historically played a central role in alliance-building. Echoing Mufasa’s message that “nothing will change if we remain isolated within our own tribes without concern for others,” the organization has consistently looked beyond its own ethnic constituency. Successive KIO leaders have emphasized solidarity with other groups subjected to military oppression, rather than focusing solely on Kachin interests. This outlook has shaped the KIO’s long-standing commitment to providing assistance and forging alliances with diverse EAOs.

Even before the 2021 coup, the KIO extended military and financial support, as well as sanctuary, to groups such as the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), the United League for Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), the Chin National Front/Army (CNF/CNA), the MNTJP/MNDAA, the PSLF/TNLA and several defunct EAOs.

It also has a history of leadership in broader coalitions, chairing the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) and serving as deputy chair of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC). While the UNFC, comprising 10 EAOs, is now defunct and the FPNCC, comprising seven EAOs, has been weakened by Chinese pressure and internal disputes, the KIO’s central role in past alliances underscores its enduring credibility as a unifying force.

New alliances

In the aftermath of the 2021 coup and the military’s brutal nationwide crackdown, thousands of peaceful protesters and politicians sought refuge and military training under the KIO. Within months, the organization emerged as one of the key EAOs offering not only safe havens and armed support, but also political backing to the resistance.

The KIO also played a pivotal role in the formation of Myanmar’s parallel government, the National Unity Government (NUG). Through the Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team (KPICT), it coordinated with the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), sending representatives who would later become prominent NUG leaders, including Acting President DuwaLashi La. Moreover, despite China’s repeated pressure not to host NUG officials along its border, the KIO sheltered the NUG in Laiza, the town where its headquarters is based, thereby enabling closer coordination and reinforcing the opposition’s political front.

Militarily, the KIA has trained, armed and organized PDFs under the NUG’s Ministry of Defence (MoD). In 2021, it helped establish Military Region-1 (MR-1), covering Sagaing, Mandalay and Magwe. Until February 2025, MR-1 operated across all three regions, but its jurisdiction has since narrowed to seven Sagaing districts (16 townships). Lieutenant General Lum Hkawng (Gwa Thu), the KIA chief of staff, even served as MR-1 commander until his death in May 2024. The KIA swiftly appointed a new commander to fill the vacancy. The KIA also chairs the Central Command and Coordination Committee, known as “C3C”, a military coordination mechanism among the NUG’s MoD, the ABSDF, CNF/CNA and Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA).

Beyond these, the KIA has trained or supported smaller groups, including the Naga PDFs, the Eastern Naga National Organization/Defense Army (ENNO/ENDA), the Kuki National Organization/Army (KNO/KNA-Burma), the Kadu Defense Force (KDF) and the Bamar Army. In recent months, several local PDFs—including the Yaw Army, Zero Guerrilla and the Chin Brotherhood (CB)—have traveled to Laiza to meet with KIO leaders such as Lt-Gen Gun Maw and KIA Vice Chief of Staff Major General ZauTawng to strengthen military coordination. Reflecting on these engagements, Salai Yaw Man, spokesperson of the CB, remarked in an interview with freelance journalist ThetHtwe Naing on Aug. 10 that the KIO/KIA “considers the whole country. They think strategically. They think big. They think far… not just for the Kachins.” Such remarks highlight the KIO’s image as a national, rather than purely ethnic, actor.

Institutionally, the KIO’s Alliance Relations Office, headed by Major General Brang Nan, continues to maintain ties with key EAOs such as the UWSP/UWSA, SSPP/SSA-N, MNTJP/MNDAA and National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA). Although relations with the PSLF/TNLA remain tense over territorial disputes, the shared struggle against the junta offers potential grounds for reconciliation.

Although the KIO has a long history of alliance-building, bringing together the growing number of local PDFs into a broader unified front would demand substantial effort and resources—human capital, finances and arms. These challenges are compounded by the KIO’s limited means, particularly after China curtailed trade flows into its territory.

For Gun Maw’s vision to materialize, resistance groups must shift from minimal coordination to deeper collaboration between EAOs and PDFs, as Min Ko Naing recommends, “Under One Chain of Command”, enabling synchronized operations. Yet whether such cohesion can be achieved remains uncertain.

As Myanmar’s struggle enters a decisive phase, the metaphor of “Mufasa” captures both hope and fragility. The KIO may indeed inspire unity, but sustaining it against a resurgent junta and powerful external pressures will test the organization’s resilience. Time alone will reveal whether the KIO can truly become the “Mufasa of Myanmar”.

Joe Kumbun is the pseudonym of an independent political analyst.

This article was originally published on The Irrawaddy.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.