Putin’s India Visit reveals New Delhi’s Complicated Strategy
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan | 14 December 2025
A major sore point in India’s relations with its Western partners is its continuing empathetic relations with Russia, especially since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022. So there was considerable attention on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India on 4 and 5 December. Indian media reports even suggested arms and economic deals were to be concluded between the two sides.
But the visit has been something of a damp squib, with the Indian government’s defenders now suggesting the message was in the visit itself rather than the meagre list of agreements signed between the two sides.
So what was the purpose of this visit? In the context of uncertainties around US President Donald Trump’s policies, India most likely wanted to demonstrate that it had other options and do so in a way that wouldn’t create additional problems with the United States and other Western partners.
India has been going through a tumultuous phase in its relationship with the US, including disagreements over Trump’s contribution to resolving a May confrontation between India and Pakistan, and US tariffs on India. This is why India is keen to show that it has other options.
This was evident earlier this year, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with Putin as well as Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Tianjin in September. With Xi, Modi was attempting to calm bilateral relations, which had suffered due to a border clash in 2020.
But the question is whether this is a feasible strategy. Barely two months after the Tianjin meeting, and despite improving relations between New Delhi and Beijing, China has again needlessly irritated India: Chinese immigration authorities harassed an Indian national from Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state that China claims, insisting she was a Chinese citizen. Though eventually resolved, the incident demonstrated again that getting along better with China would be difficult.
If the strategy of stabilising ties with China appears shaky, leaning on Russia is at least equally problematic. The invasion of Ukraine has considerably weakened Russia, which is now beholden to China more than ever. Meanwhile, India is in no position to help, so Russia can depend only on China.
India definitely tried to demonstrate Russia’s continuing importance. Breaking diplomatic protocol, Modi received Putin with a bear-hug on the tarmac. Instead of travelling in separate vehicles, the two chose to get in the same car, demonstrating a certain amount of friendliness and comfort in their relationship.
But beyond these symbols, little came of the visit. The talk about India’s plans to buy Su-57 fighters turned out to be just rumours. Russia had reportedly confirmed that Moscow and New Delhi would discuss possible Indian procurement of Su-57s during Putin’s visit. The reported plan was for India to purchase two squadrons of the aircraft, with the possibility of licensed production by Hindustan Aeronautics in Nashik in western India. India urgently needs to augment its fighter squadrons, which have been depleting quickly, but it is unclear whether the Russian aircraft are technologically good enough to match Chinese or US fighters.
Similarly, there was talk that Putin and Modi would discuss Indian acquisition of S-400 surface-to-air missile systems or even joint production of batteries of the later S-500 model. Another reported possibility was a lease of a nuclear-powered Akula-class hunter-killer submarine. But no such agreements have been confirmed.
The agreements that were signed were meagre ones that did not reflect the depth of political relations the two countries claimed to have. New Delhi was likely concerned that deepening ties with Russia would create unnecessary difficulties in India’s relations with the US, as well as with other partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
Ideally, New Delhi would like to balance various partners, which means not antagonising any. A loud visit with few substantive outcomes may have been considered just right.
The danger in such a strategy is that India will end up satisfying nobody. Russia may be irritated that India is not supporting it fully; others may consider that India has gone too far. Unfortunately, facing a powerful China, India probably thinks that it needs all partners. This means that India will continue to play this highwire act, with the ever-present danger of falling on its face.
Raji Rajagopalan is a resident senior fellow at ASPI.
This article was originally published on The Strategist.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.