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For more than three decades, Washington’s Myanmar policy began with one question: how does the country get back to democracy? Under President Trump, that has changed.

The new “Integrated Country Strategy for Burma,” approved Aug. 31 and published recently, asks instead: what can Myanmar do for America? Its four goals are to stop scams and visa overstays, sell more American goods, broker peace by 2030, and push back against China.

That does not mean Washington has abandoned sanctions or opposition contacts. It means the embassy’s metrics of success have changed.

At times, the 11-page document reads like a scorecard: three commercial deals, triple Myanmar’s imports from the U.S., three peace forums, zero visa overstays. The embassy’s 2022 strategy prioritized restoring inclusive democracy. In the new one the word “democracy” does not even appear, nor do “political prisoners” or “airstrikes.” Human rights feature mostly as a benefit of stability.

Its most revealing line, on Page 9, says talks on “fiscal federalism and territorial demarcation…will create opportunities to access Burma’s bountiful rare earth resources and combat scam centers.”

There is nothing wrong with Washington pursuing its interests. But a country at war is not a market where one government can sign away the obstacles. In Myanmar, authority to sign agreements, control of territory and public consent rarely rest in the same hands, and this strategy confuses the first with the other two.

Assistant Secretary of State Michael Vance met Min Aung Hlaing in Naypyitaw on Sept. 15-16, ostensibly to seek the release of American businessman Adam Castillo and discuss scam operations. Talks also took place in Tokyo in June and again in October. Some Myanmar-linked individuals have come off U.S. sanctions lists, though Min Aung Hlaing remains blacklisted. The generals have also made their case through a $3 million-a-year lobbying contract with DCI Group, later involving Trump ally Roger Stone.

No mineral deal can bypass China

Myanmar is a major source of heavy rare earths used in powerful magnets. In 2024, however, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) took Pangwa and Chipwi, the heart of the border mining belt, from a military-aligned militia. Stimson Center researchers have documented mining expanding into other ethnic armed territories, including the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)’s.

Even if they wanted to forge a new deal with the U.S., the generals cannot hand over land they do not hold, nor would getting ore out of Myanmar by itself create an American alternative to China. The trade depends on Chinese buyers, routes, chemicals and processing. Almost all of Myanmar’s heavy rare earths are transported overland to China. No deal signed in Naypyitaw can replace a whole supply chain.

Asking the arsonist to fight the fire

On scams, Washington has a strong national-security case: Americans have lost billions to Southeast Asian fraud operations, some staffed by trafficked people forced to commit crimes.

But look at who protects the compounds. The most notorious epicenters of scam operations, such as ShweKokko and KK Park, grew up along the Thai border under the protection of Naypyitaw-allied armed militias. In May 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Karen National Army, formerly the Karen Border Guard Force, and commander Saw Chit Thu for enabling scams and trafficking. Treasury knew that the militia had profited from its military ties.

In an Oct. 30 assessment, the Financial Action Task Force kept Myanmar on its high-risk list, citing scam centers. A law-enforcement deal with Naypyitaw might help individual cases but will not dismantle networks whose protectors profit from them. Washington cannot suddenly expect verifiable action against their finances and operators from the generals.

The human reality behind overstay numbers

The repatriation goal carries another danger. It seeks to eliminate visa overstays, a popular policy objective for Trump, by fostering closer cooperation with “Burmese authorities.” Yet Washington’s own travel advisory warns of arbitrary detention, punishment for criticism and military conscription in Myanmar, and the strategy offers no specific safeguards for dissidents, journalists, defectors or draft-age people facing return. Are overstay statistics to replace individual assessments of protection claims against these dangers that the U.S. itself has flagged? People fleeing persecution must not become bargaining chips.

Selling soybeans in a warzone

The State Department wants three deals worth more than US$5 million each and a tripling of goods and agricultural exports to Myanmar by 2030. In 2025, U.S. exports to Myanmar totaled $78.7 million, compared with $762.3 million in imports. The strategy blames import licensing and currency controls, again proposing talks with “decision-makers in Naypyitaw.” But these are not merely paperwork problems. They come from a regime that is short of dollars, prints money to pay for a war, and runs a banking system on the global watchdog’s blacklist. This is no emerging market waiting for American soybeans. It is an economy ravaged by the war these decision-makers in Naypyitaw unleashed.

Peace is not a box to check

Most troubling is how peace fits into this commercial plan. Ethnic and religious minorities, displaced communities and residents of mining areas need a say, not a place as beneficiaries of someone else’s deal. Without a federal government, there is no one in Myanmar who can govern, collect revenue, protect minorities and answer when armed men abuse civilians. Any peace forum is only as credible as the voices it allows in.

The strategy’s goal of reaching 3 million vulnerable people with humanitarian assistance is welcome. But access also depends on local authorities and civil groups whose futures cannot be negotiated in Naypyitaw.

None of this means Washington should stop pursuing its interests or categorically reject engagement with the military. Some channels can still free detainees, fight crime, and deliver aid. But the U.S. should maintain targeted pressure on military finances, arms procurement and jet-fuel supplies while continuing to engage seriously with the National Unity Government (NUG), Myanmar’s parallel pro-democracy government formed after the 2021 coup, ethnic armed organizations and local administrations, recognizing their different roles and political interests. Treating the generals as the principal brokers of Myanmar’s future would be a fundamental mistake.

America need not choose between its strategic interests and Myanmar’s democratic future. An “America First” policy could serve both: durable trade, credible law enforcement and secure mineral supplies depend on accountable power. The Trump administration needs to recognize that America’s long-term interests would be better served by a democratic, federal Myanmar than by continued military rule.

Nyein Chan Aye is a Burmese journalist based in Washington, D.C., who previously worked for the BBC and Voice of America. He writes on Myanmar, U.S. policy, China and regional affairs.

This article was originally published on The Irrawaddy. 

Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.