---

Imagine a country rich in minerals that are essential to the global economy, yet still struggling to turn those resources into broad national prosperity. This is the challenge facing Zambia. Copper, cobalt, lithium, nickel, graphite, and rare earth elements are increasingly described as critical minerals because they are essential for electric vehicles, renewable-energy systems, electricity networks, and modern technologies. As geopolitical competition intensifies, access to these minerals has become a strategic concern for China, the United States, the European Union, and other major economies.

For African countries, this competition creates both opportunity and risk. The continent possesses many of the minerals required for the global energy transition, but much of its mineral wealth has historically been exported in raw or lightly processed form. Limited infrastructure, technology, financing, and industrial capacity have often prevented African states from capturing more value from extraction. Zambia illustrates this problem clearly. It is one of Africa’s major copper producers, but its long mining history has not always produced the level of economic transformation expected from such resource wealth.

Copper has shaped Zambia’s economy since the colonial period. Large-scale mining in the Copperbelt encouraged the construction of railways, towns, and industrial infrastructure, and copper remained the country’s most important export after independence in 1964. President Kenneth Kaunda’s government believed that political independence should be accompanied by greater economic control over natural resources. The 1969 Matero Reforms increased state ownership in mining, and the major state-controlled operations were later consolidated into Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) in 1982. The goal was to ensure that mining revenue supported employment, infrastructure, and social services.^[i]

However, dependence on copper also exposed Zambia to global price shocks. Falling copper prices after the mid-1970s, together with declining production, debt, outdated technology, and insufficient investment, weakened the state-led model. By the 1990s, economic crisis and pressure from international financial institutions pushed Zambia toward liberalisation. Privatisation of ZCCM began in 1996 and was largely completed by 2000. Foreign investors brought capital and technology that helped revive production, but privatisation also created debate over foreign ownership, employment, and whether Zambia was receiving a fair share of the value produced by its minerals.^[ii]

That unresolved question remains at the centre of Zambia’s mineral politics today. Under President Hakainde Hichilema, first elected in 2021, the government has tried to combine investor-friendly policies with greater domestic participation and value addition. His United Party for National Development (UPND) pledged to improve mining governance, expand the copper value chain, and increase the economic benefits Zambia receives from its mineral resources. During his first term, the government focused on restoring investor confidence, expanding production, and attracting new investment into mining.^[iii]

Hichilema was re-elected in August 2026 and began a second five-year term in September. His re-election gives the government political continuity at a moment when Zambia’s mineral resources are becoming more strategically important.^[iv]Yet the second term also begins with pressure to demonstrate that investment and mining growth can improve everyday life. In 2024, a survey found that 66 percent of Zambians believed the country was moving in the wrong direction, while 73 percent described national economic conditions as fairly bad or very bad. The rising cost of living was the issue citizens most wanted the government to address.^[v]

This dissatisfaction matters for Zambia’s critical-minerals strategy. The government may succeed in attracting foreign capital and increasing copper exports, but citizens are likely to judge that success through jobs, prices, income, electricity access, and public services. The political challenge for Hichilema is therefore not simply to expand the mining sector, but to show that Zambia’s growing importance in global mineral supply chains can generate visible domestic benefits. If mineral-sector growth does not improve living standards, the gap between national economic ambitions and public expectations could widen.

Zambia’s National Critical Minerals Strategy 2024–2028 is designed to address part of this problem. It identifies 11 strategically important minerals: copper, cobalt, lithium, nickel, graphite, manganese, columbite-tantalite, tin, uranium, sugilite, and rare earth elements. Its priorities include better geological mapping, stronger government-private-sector partnerships, beneficiation and value addition, and research and development.^[vi] The strategy shows that Zambia does not want to remain simply a supplier of raw minerals. It wants to participate more fully in the value chain. 

Value addition is especially important. Processing and refining minerals domestically could create jobs, develop technical skills, strengthen manufacturing, increase government revenue, and allow Zambia to retain a larger share of the economic value generated from its resources. This is also why the government has set a target of increasing annual copper production from roughly 800,000 tonnes to three million tonnes by 2031. The production strategy is intended to stimulate exploration, mining, processing, and the supply of mining-related goods and services.^[vii]

However, increasing production alone will not guarantee transformation. Zambia could produce far more copper while continuing to export much of its economic value abroad. The country still faces electricity shortages, infrastructure constraints, limited processing capacity, shortages of specialised skills, and the high cost of financing major mining projects. Large-scale mining also requires foreign capital and technology, creating a difficult balance between attracting multinational investors and retaining greater national control over the benefits of extraction.

Geopolitics gives Zambia additional bargaining power. China has long been an important investor in Zambian mining and infrastructure, while Western countries are increasingly interested in alternative sources of critical minerals. Zambia has generally avoided presenting this as a simple choice between China and the West. Instead, it can use competition among external partners to seek investment, technology, infrastructure, and market access. Critical minerals therefore function not only as commodities but also as instruments of economic diplomacy.

The central question is whether Zambia can turn this geopolitical advantage into domestic economic value. Its history shows the limitations of both heavy state control and extensive dependence on foreign investors. Hichilema’s second term therefore faces a more demanding test than simply raising production. The government must connect mining growth with local processing, employment, industrial development, and improved living standards.

Zambia’s fight for value is ultimately taking place on two fronts. Internationally, it must negotiate with powerful governments and multinational companies that want secure access to strategic minerals. Domestically, it must convince citizens that the mineral boom can improve their lives. If Zambia can retain more value through processing, skills, local industries, and stronger institutions, critical minerals could become a foundation for long-term economic transformation. If it cannot, the country risks repeating an old pattern in a new global economy: exporting valuable resources while much of the wealth created from them is captured elsewhere.

Tanzila Hosain Tonny is a research assistant at CGS 

Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.

Endnote